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The Missing Half of Missouri v Jenkins:
Determining the Scope of a Judicial

Desegregation Remedy
Gwendolyn S. Andreyf

In Missouri v Jenkins,' the United States Supreme Court
ruled five to four that a federal court may impose a local property
tax increase to finance school desegregation remedies. Justice
White, writing for the majority, held that a federal court could
compel such tax increases only by enjoining obstructive state statutes or ordering local authorities to exercise their own taxing authority rather than by directly imposing the tax, which would interfere with principles of federalism. The Court addressed only the
issue of funding the desegregation remedy, having declined2 to
grant certiorari on the issue of the scope of the remedy itself.
The case involved a court-ordered desegregation plan for the
Kansas City, Missouri, School District ("KCMSD") stemming
from an action brought under 42 USC § 1983. The plan provided
detailed remedies for desegregation, including a method of financing. The district court had allocated 75 percent of the cost of the
plan to the state and 25 percent to KCMSD, with joint and several
liability.' However, a provision of the Missouri state constitution
prevented KCMSD from raising its tax levy above a certain level,
which effectively made KCMSD unable to pay its share.5 The district court refused to let the state absorb the full cost of the plan,
so it "found itself with no choice" but to order the tax levy increased through fiscal year 1991-92.1.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, but noted that, in the future, the district
court must not set the tax rate itself but instead should authorize

t B.A. 1989, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Chicago.
1 110 S Ct 1651 (1990).
2 Id at 1664.

1 Id at 1655. Allegations that a district is operating a segregated school system arise
under 42 USC § 1983 (1988).
" Jenkins, 110 S Ct at 1657.
5 Id at 1656.

6 Id at 1658.
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KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authority 7 and
enjoin the state law preventing KCMSD from adequately funding
the remedy.8 The Supreme Court upheld the distinction created by
the Court of Appeals, holding that authorizing and directing local
institutions to devise and implement remedies, such as a tax levy,
is constitutional.9 This power to enjoin obstructive state provisions
greatly enhances federal courts' equitable powers in the area of
desegregation. 10
The ruling is remarkable because it upholds civil rights by allowing judicial intervention in the area of taxation, traditionally
the sole province of local governmental bodies." The Court declined to examine the scope of the desegregation remedy, however,
accepting the appellate court's conclusion that the remedy was
proper.'" The Court's ruling thus expands the powers of federal
courts to implement desegregation remedies while at the same time
consciously neglects to discuss the practical aspects involved in designing and implementing an effective court-ordered remedy.' 3
Missouri v. Jenkins provides a good starting point for examining the role of the judiciary in sculpting, implementing, and monitoring a remedial plan for desegregation. The case raises two important issues: constitutional federalism concerns of the sort dealt
with in the Court's opinion, and broader questions about the practical effects of judicial school management through desegregation
remedies. The latter is the focus of this Comment. Part I gives a
brief history of desegregation decisions, part II argues for judicial
intervention to accomplish effective desegregation, and part III
gives concrete examples of desegregation techniques and the situations where they are most effective.

Idat 1658-59.
8

Jenkins, 110 S Ct at 1658-59.

' Id at 1664-67. The Supreme Court rejected other constitutional challenges, based on
the Tenth Amendment and Article III, to the order issued by the Court of Appeals.

Id at 1663.
" Id.
"

Jenkins, 110 S Ct at 1663.

See the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, who agreed that the Court had jurisdiction and that the District Court exceeded its authority, but who would have reversed the
Court of Appeals decision to order a tax levy. Justice Kennedy noted the extensive provi-

sions of the remedial plan were "without parallel." Id at 1668.
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I.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF DESEGREGATION DECISIONS

Court-ordered desegregation efforts essentially began in 1954
with Brown v Board of Educ. ("Brown IP)," which ended the regime of "separate but equal" school systems permitted in 1896 by
Plessy v Ferguson.15 One year later, in Brown II, the Supreme
Court ordered that desegregation proceed "with all deliberate
speed.""6 The Court did not place any fixed limitations on the
scope of courts' equitable powers, characterizing equity as having
"practical flexibility."" For the most part, early desegregation
plans in the South consisted of freedom of choice remedies."
Green v Board of Educ.,19 the first Supreme Court case to address
the substantive requirements of a desegregation remedy, ended the
freedom of choice practice. The Court noted that freedom of choice
initiatives had virtually no impact on the degree of segregation,
and ordered that states use alternative remedies.
A short debate ensued over what alternative methods should
be used, after which the Supreme Court decided Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.20 In Swann, the Court stated that
vestiges of state-imposed segregation must cease to exist and sanctioned the use of district-wide busing.21 The Court placed two limitations on courts' remedial powers. First, judicial intervention may
occur only after local school authorities have failed in their affirmative obligations to end discrimination.2 2 Second, the scope of
the remedy must be determined by the scope of the federal constitutional violation. 2 The Court acknowledged that strict race neutrality in a desegregation plan might not accommodate the goal of
remedying past de jure segregation.2 ' Thus, children could be assigned and bused to school under a race-conscious assignment system. The first major desegregation decision outside the South was
"

347 US 483 (1954).

163 US 537 (1896).
16 Brown v Board of Educ., 349 US 294, 301 (1955) ("Brown II").
ls

Id at 300.
1SFreedom of choice remedies allowed students to attend the neighborhood school of
their choice. See Finis Welch and Audrey Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation24
17

(US Commission on Civil Rights Clearinghouse Publication 92, 1987).
" 391 US 430 (1968).
,0 402 US 1 (1971).

"Id.
Id at 15.
Id at 16.
Swann, 402 US at 28. De jure segregation is state-imposed, whereas de facto segregation occurs by default.
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Keyes v School Dist. No. 1,25 in which the Court stated that official

action leading to de facto segregation was equivalent to de jure
segregation.2 e The next significant decision was Milliken v Bradley, 7 in which the Court considered an interdistrict busing remedy
that included both primarily black, inner-city districts and primarily white, suburban districts in the desegregation plan. The Court
held that the interdistrict plan was invalid because inclusion of a
suburban district in a plan required proof that it had engaged in
segregative practices that had an interdistrict effect.2 8 The Su-

preme Court then attempted to articulate a definitive standard for
setting limits on the equitable powers of the federal courts in constructing a desegregation plan. The Court set forth a three-part
test. First, the "nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation ....
Second, the decree must indeed be remedial in nature ....
[Third, the remedy] must take into account the interests of state
and local authorities in managing their own affairs."2 The test sets
forth criteria, but does not define with much more precision than
earlier desegregation cases what the federal courts can and cannot
do.so
The Milliken approach reflects a corrective, or remedial,
stance toward racial justice, as opposed to a prohibitory or distributive stance."1 A prohibitory approach simply prohibits the undesirable behavior, without any further steps to address the wrongs it
created. A distributive approach actively attempts to chart future
behavior through shaping mechanisms such as hiring quotas.2 The
corrective model, however, focuses on three elements: (1) an intentional discrimination or violation, (2) a direct link between the violation and the remedy, and (3) wider principles of limitation than
25 413 US 189 (1973).

16Id. Keyes also extended desegregation remedies to Hispanics.
37

433 US 267 (1977).

28 Id.

*' Id at 280-81.
" For a more detailed discussion of earlier cases, see Note, JudicialTaxation in Deseg-

regation Cases, 89 Colum L Rev 332 (1989); Welch & Light, New Evidence at 29 (cited in
note 18); William Bradford Reynolds, The Role of the Federal Government in School De-

segregation, in LaMar P. Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty: Perspectives on Desegregation 47
(NYU Metropolitan Center for Educational Research, 1986).
"1Paul Gerwitz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 Colum L Rev 728 (1986).
81 Id at 730.
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the link, such as political or constitutional limitations." These
34
three elements are evident in the three-step Miliken test.

As Professor Gerwitz notes, "[tihe defendant's violation is not
simply a trigger for judicially mandated action, unleashing a freewheeling judicial policy-making power. Rather, the remedy must
be linked to the violation as a corrective, a measure that seeks to
eliminate the violation's harmful effects." 5 Gerwitz further argues,
however, that the linkage principle espoused by the Court in Milliken becomes a powerful engine of transformation, enabling federal
courts to devise extremely broad remedies over long periods of
time. 6 Evidence of this assertion can be found in the ongoing debate over how and when a court should relinquish control over a
school district upon a finding of unitariness3 7
The first interdistrict remedy was approved in Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v Board of Educ.,5 where the Sixth Circuit found
that the strict interdistrict test in Milliken had been met. The first
case sanctioning the use of magnet schools 9 as a desegregation
technique was Morgan v Kerrigan,'0 and the first all-magnet
school plan was implemented in Milwaukee. 1
Thus, courts have great leeway in determining the scope of a
desegregation remedy, even after Milliken, but not much guidance
from the long line of decisions since Brown I. The unique, all-encompassing remedy in Missouri v Jenkins explicitly illustrates the
lack of constraints on the judiciary's equitable powers. Justice
Kennedy in his concurrence quotes from the Eighth Circuit's
dissent:
The remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously
seen in a school desegregation case. The sheer immensity
of the programs encompassed by the district court's order-the large number of magnet schools and the quantity of capital renovations and new construction-are
33

Id.

See text accompanying note 28.
Gerwitz, 86 Colum L Rev at 732.
36Id at 733.
37 See the recent decision in Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City v Dowell, 111 S Ct 630
(1991). See also Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After A Finding of Unitariness in
School DesegregationLitigation, 100 Harv L Rev 653 (1987); Denis Terez, Protecting the
Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 Case W L Rev 41 (1986).
" 521 F2d 578 (6th Cir 1975).
" Magnet schools draw students from all over a district into special programs. See text
accompanying note 78.
" 401 F Supp 216 (D Mass 1975).
41 Welch & Light, New Evidence at 29 (cited in note 18).
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concededly without parallel in any other school district in
the country.' 2
The programs included construction of a new performing arts
school, a technical magnet school, a 25-acre petting farm, a 25-acre
wildland area, fifteen microcomputers for every classroom, a two
thousand square foot planetarium, an alarm system, greenhouses,
vivariums, a Model United Nations wired for language translation,
broadcast radio and TV, a temperature-controlled art gallery, and
an 1,875 square foot animal room for elementary school students.4 3
Justice Kennedy pointed out that "these items are a part of legitimate political debate over educational policy and spending priorities, not the Constitution's command of racial equality.""
By not examining the scope and propriety of this extraordinary remedy, the Court failed to address the important practical
issues involved with judicial management of a school system. Concerns of judicial economy, expertise, and efficacy all suggest that
the role of the federal court in desegregation cases is more delicate
and political than the Supreme Court decisions, culminating with
Jenkins, imply.

II.

THE NEED FOR A HIGH LEVEL OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

Before addressing the need for a high level of judicial intervention to ensure the effective implementation of desegregation
plans, it is useful to examine the effects and desirability of desegregation. Desegregation's positive effects and desirability as public
policy outweigh the negative effects. Mandatory, court-ordered
remedies prove the most effective at implementing desegregation.
Effects of Desegregation

A.

In several studies, researchers have found that black students'
achievement level has increased after desegregation. In the late
1960s, blacks on average scored three grade levels below whites,
but by the late 1970s, when desegregation plans had been meaningfully implemented, blacks scored only two grade levels below
whites.' 5 Professor Crain found that white students' achievement

" Missouri v Jenkins, 110
43

S Ct 1651, 1668 (1990).

Id at 1676-77.

, Id at 1677.
"

Robert Crain, The Research on the Effects of School Desegregation: Real Estate

Prices,College Degrees, and Miscellaneous Other Things, in Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty

at 40 (cited in note 30).
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did not decrease in a desegregated environment because individual
students were only indirectly affected by their classmates. 6 While
noting that psychological factors were harder to quantify, Crain
found that black students in a desegregated environment felt they
had a greater sense of control over their environment, increased
opportunities, higher and more realizable job aspirations, increased
opportunity for contacts and "netWorking," a greater likelihood of
completing high school and/or college, and an ability to work cooperatively with white students. 7 On the other hand, blacks also experienced a general loss of self-esteem, based on a perceived notion
of failure when compared to white students."8
The exact cause and effect relationship between desegregation
and black achievement is open to interpretation. Many complex
factors enter into the statistics, such as long-term housing patterns
and parental involvement. e For example, Crain cited the fact that
black students did better in schools with more black teachers.50
The reason is unclear: Is this because white teachers discriminate
against black students? Or because black teachers discriminate in
favor of black students? Or is it because black students work
harder in the presence of black role models? Whatever the reason,
Crain argues, schools should endeavor to hire more black teachers." The effects of desegregation do -not end with graduation, but
continue into the job market and the community. Also, schools as
institutions influence other institutions throughout the country,
and desegregated institutions should be the rule, not the exception.
The National Education Association ("NEA") Report of
198452 noted eight benefits of desegregation:

(1) It prepares students for diversity in the world after
school.
(2) It increases public support for community needs because of perceived "larger stakes" in the community.
(3) It produces a positive climate, because only a school
could integrate people this closely every day.

"

Id at 41.

17

Id at 41-43.

'8 Id at 41.
1, Crain, Research on the Effects of School Desegregation, in Miller, ed, Brown Plus
Thirty at 42 (cited in note 45).
60 Id at 41.
" Id.
" Beverly P. Cole, An NAACP Perspective on the Status of Public School Desegregation, in Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 22, 23 (cited in note 30).
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(4) Parental involvement increases, which monitors and
enhances school progress.
(5) It produces progress in housing desegregation.
(6) Achievement scores improve (for all children).
(7) Educational improvement of norms and attitudes (for
all children).
(8) It produces deliberate attempts to eliminate inequities in building facilities and educational resources."
The NEA Report also noted several remaining problems:
(1) A disproportionately high suspension and expulsion
rate for blacks.
(2) Higher black dropout rates.
(3) Segregated classrooms through "tracking" curricula.
(4) A still-present achievement test gap.
(5) Some extracurricular activities have only white
participants.5
Another negative effect of desegregation is the much-studied
phenomenon of "white flight" from the soon-to-be-integrated urban district to the suburbs. White flight occurs when the perceived
costs of remaining in the district outweigh the perceived benefits of
desegregation. 5 White parents' perceived costs, according to Professor Rossell, are:
1. The quality of education will decline.
2. Their child will be emotionally or physically harassed.
3. Their child will be exposed to bad academic, social,
and sexual attitudes and behavior.
4. They will lose influence over their child's education.
5. Their property values will decline."
Nevertheless, the positive effects of desegregation still outweigh
the bad.
B. The Need for Judicial Intervention
Given the positive effects of desegregation and its desirability
as public policy, not to mention its constitutional imperative, how
as Id.
54 Id.
5 Christine H. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does it Say About the
Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J Legal Stud 69, 74 (1983).
Id at 74-75. Characteristics of white flight in relation to specific desegregation plans
are discussed in section III.B. See text accompanying notes 95-101.

253]

DESEGREGATION REMEDY

can desegregation best be achieved? The options are through
court-initiated or school board-initiated plans, and these plans can
include mandatory or voluntary reassignment of students. Courtordered desegregation plans with mandatory reassignment of students achieve better results than other types of plans, thus necessitating a high level of judicial intervention in desegregation cases.
Empirically, court-ordered, mandatory desegregation plans are
more successful. 57 Courts have broader remedial powers at their
disposal than school boards do, thus producing greater compliance.
Positive incentives for voluntary desegregation, such as promised
funding through the now-repealed Emergency School Assistance
Act, have had little effect. Negative incentives, such as withholding
funding under the Act, produced less response than court-imposed
fines or jail sentences." The equitable powers of a federal court,
along with its ability to absorb responsibility for unpopular policies, make mandatory court-ordered remedies more successful than
those designed by elected school boards.
Another option within the category of court-ordered plans is
to desegregate voluntarily through the settlement process.59 Again,
however, the court and the threat of judicial intervention have already made their presence felt. Furthermore, school boards usually
do not settle for other than voluntary, magnet school programs
that do not make the boards accountable for unpopular reassignment programs or costly building improvements.6 0
One problem with court-ordered plans is that the desire to
foist accountability for implementing desegregation onto the courts
often produces collusion problems between the parties. The school
boards, along with the plaintiffs, would like to see expensive new
improvements to their school buildings, higher-paid teachers, and
better programs, all under the name of a desegregation remedy.
Because Milliken allowed broad remedies and because courts cannot reallocate financial resources between districts,"' desegregation
remedies are used to cure deficits in minority education. The remedial approach adopted in Milliken allows schools to accomplish
much more than just physical desegregation. School boards view
87 Id at 71. For further statistics, see, generally, Welch & Light, New Evidence at 58-65
(cited in note 18).
" Rossell, 12 J Legal Stud at 71-73.
69 D. Bruce La Pierre, Voluntary InterdistrictSchool Desegregationin St. Louis: The
Special Master's Tale, 1987 Wis L Rev 971.
" Nathaniel R. Jones, Impact of Desegregationon Childrenin the 1980s and 1990s, in
Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 52, 53 (cited in note 30).
, San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1 (1973).
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the desegregation process as a convenient means to upgrade programs and raise tax levies without suffering the normal accountability of elected officials; the boards can shift the blame to the
courts 2
Another problem with settlement is the lack of public information available afterward. This is true for any kind of settlement
agreement, but given the political nature of desegregation, public
affirmation of the right to equal schools sends a distinct message to
the community. As Judge Nathaniel Jones of the Sixth Circuit
notes, "within the black community there is a strong degree of
skepticism and suspicion about having anyone but a federal judge
dispose of school desegregation cases. ''" 3 Thus, mandatory, courtordered remedies provide the only practical public resolution
available.
School board-initiated, voluntary plans are an alternative to
court-ordered plans. One argument for this type of desegregation is
that a voluntary plan possessing community support would result
in less white flight and greater black-white contact. Los Angeles is
the only city showing support for this assertion. The fact that
desegregation cases are still being decided testifies to the reluctance of communities to desegregate voluntarily. Thus, court-ordered plans, or the threat of court-ordered plans, tend to produce
better results. As Julius Chambers, plaintiff's counsel in Swann,
noted,
Voluntarily, no one will come up with a plan that will
ensure equal educational opportunities. . . . In the implementation of the plans somehow black schools still
end up underfunded. But more importantly, students will
not get the kind of exposure that is needed to make
America great, for education affects the total person and
the total community.6
Thus, if left on their own, school boards will not design desegregation plans that result in mandatory reassignment of students, leav6, Jones, Impact of Desegregation,in Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 53. On the question of accountability, see also Joseph C. Smith, Jr., A Proposal for Coherence and Accountabilityin American Public Education (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author).
0 Jones, Impact of Desegregation,in Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 53.
Rossell, 12 J Legal Stud at 94 (cited in note 55) citing Michael Ross, The Effectiveness of Alternative DesegregationStrategies: The Issue of Voluntary Versus Mandatory
Policies in Los Angeles (1981) (unpublished manuscript, Boston U Dept of Sociology).
"' Cole, NAACP Perspective, in Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 23 (cited in note 52).
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ing court-ordered plans as the best method of implementing
desegregation.
C.

How Judges Should Intervene

Given the need for a high level of judicial intervention in
school desegregation, how should judges pursue this task? Judges
need to communicate closely with educational planners, who can
more efficiently work out the details of a specific plan. Judges also
need to lay out more specific legal criteria to help educational
planners design remedies.
When judges construct a remedial order to implement desegregation, they combine the legislative functions of political savvy and
social policy with legal precedent and judicial negotiation. John
Letson, superintendent of schools in Atlanta, states that the remedy is not a legal matter so much as one of social engineering: "The
remedy oftentimes does not, and should not, require the narrow
point-of-law approach. A legal precedent doggedly pursued without
regard to local social or educational consequences may lead to the
defeat of the very end which the remedy seeks." 66 Thus, the trial
judge, the attorneys, and the educational planners must all communicate and cooperate to ensure that an effective remedy will be
designed and successfully implemented.
Educators stress the need for communication between the parties. 7 Educational planners need accurate data on which to develop potential plans. A partial list of necessary data includes:
* Student population identified by domicile, race, and socioeconomic characteristics;
• Racial composition of student populations of each
school;
* Socioeconomic and educational characteristics of the
total district population by residence; .
* Total population and enrollment projections;
" Number, capacity, condition, and location of educational facilities;
" Organization of system by grade level;
* Staffing patterns, assignments, and racial composition;
• Transportation available and projected needs;
06 Forbes Bottomly, The Professional Educator in the Desegregation Suit, in Howard
Kalodner and John Fishman, eds, The Limits of Justice: Courts' Role in School Desegregation 621, 625 (Ballinger, 1978).
67 Id.
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* Financial needs, with budgeting practices and
procedures;
* Description and location of special programs, alternative schools, and kindergartens;
* Applicable state laws, rules, and regulations governing
the schools;
* Accrediting agency requirements;
" Public information needs and public involvement;
* Resources outside the schools, such as private schools,
higher education, businesses, and associations;
* Curricular and instructional methods, materials, and
needs;
* Multicultural needs;
" Staff, parents, and student human-relations training
requirements;
* Options for hardship cases and students with special
needs;
- Time limitations and deadlines for implementation. 8
This partial list demonstrates the complexity involved in designing
a remedy. In the interest of efficiency,69 educational planners, not
judges, should consider these details. Ultimately, however, judges
must approve any plan.
Communication and acquisition of the needed data are essential, despite the problem of information costs. For example, simply
defining the student population by domicile, race, and socioeconomic characteristics would require analyzing a great deal of data
and using a great deal of time and resources. Nevertheless, such
information is central to the very definition of a desegregation
plan, and a necessary factor for a judge to consider. If educational
planners can assemble and process the data as much as possible
before presenting it to the judge, then judicial administrative costs
can be kept reasonably contained.
Courts and judges can facilitate the planning process by laying
out more specific criteria than the Supreme Court has done in
Green, Swann, Keyes, Milliken, or Jenkins. Forbes Bottomly, a
former superintendent of schools and an educational planner in a
Seattle desegregation case, 70 suggests that judges clarify the following for planners:
" Id at 635.
" Id at 630-31.
7*

(1971).

Citizens Against Mandatory Busing v Palmason, 80 Wash 2d 121, 492 P2d 536
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(1) The tenable limits within which students may be assigned to schools to achieve constitutionally acceptable
desegregation.
(2) The degree to which optional attendance zones, neutral sites, magnet schools, and alternative programs fit
the law.
(3) The variance, if any, from the tenable limits which
will be allowable for special education of the handicapped, for the gifted, for kindergarten children, for athletic and other extracurricular programs.
(4) The definition of desegregation within a school system, such as prohibition against tracking, ability grouping, and other segregative assignments.
(5) A definition, within tenable limits, of a desegregated
staff, including teachers, administrators, and nonteaching
employees.
(6) A guide for equitable distribution of resources among
the schools.
(7) A meaning of "burden"-that is, the measure to
which desegregation may be achieved through disproportionately burdening minority students and minority communities with school closures, one-way assignments, busing distances and other inconveniences.
(8) A definition of "reasonable" transportation times and
distances.
(9) The extent to which metropolitization may be considered in a remedial plan.
(10) Other instructions such as a timetable for submission of the plan or plans; target date, at least for implementation; a description for an appeal procedure for
hardship cases; and a process for monitoring the plan,
once implemented."
The specificity of Bottomly's concerns illustrates how vague the
Supreme Court's guidelines have been concerning the constitutionally permissible scope of desegregation plans. On the one hand,
broad, unspecified equitable powers are desirable to deal with the
individual complexities of plans for various school districts. On the
other hand, a lack of specificity can cause those plans to stagnate
and die in the making.
Bottomly, The Professional Educator, in Kalodner & Fishman, eds, Limits of Justice at 633-34 (cited in note 66).
'"
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Given this lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the
need for specific, tenable plans, how can judges craft an effective
desegregation remedy? What options are available? Peter Roos
discusses some of the concrete methods by which greater equality
may be achieved.7 2 He suggests reallocating experienced teachers,

repairing or replacing outdated or inadequate facilities, encouraging parental involvement, "reverse" busing (sending white students
to black schools), 73 building smaller schools, and revising curricula
to eliminate discriminatory tracking. In addition, providing monetary incentives to teachers, as well as class ratio reduction and
mentoring programs, would help reduce problems of inexperienced
teachers and overcrowding. Roos also suggests creating magnet
schools, although the effectiveness of magnet schools without in7
terdistrict involvement might not be satisfactory.
One problem with too much expert community and educational planning advice, however, is that in many desegregation
cases the parties will collude and present staggering plans to the
court to implement. An example of this is the Kansas City plan,
which Justice Kennedy identified as the most elaborate one ever
created. Because the court must make the final decision to approve
a desegregation plan, and because information provided by local
officials may be suspect, the absence of clearer desegregation plan
standards from the Supreme Court permits plans like the one in
Jenkins to be approved without any checks on elaborateness whatsoever. The Supreme Court needs to establish national desegregation remedy guidelines that incorporate local needs.
III.

TYPES OF REMEDIES AND WHERE THEY WORK

Many studies have been done on types of desegregation remedies and much data collected on the desegregation patterns in different cities. Examining the relationship between the type of plan
and where it has been most effective provides valuable information
for judges and educational planners to use in crafting a desegregation remedy for a particular district.

Peter Roos, Separate and Unequal: The Common Element in Common Schools (unpublished manuscript on file with the Legal Forum).
"' Some researchers argue, however, that reverse busing aggravates the problem of
white flight and should be avoided. See Rossell, 12 J Legal Stud at 87 (cited in note 55).
74 Id at 69.
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A.

Desegregation Techniques

The United States Commission for Civil Rights identified six
major techniques used in desegregation.7 5 These techniques could
be used singly or in combination in a remedy. The first three of
76
them are voluntary techniques, the latter three are involuntary.
1. Freedom of choice / Open enrollment.
This voluntary technique allows students to transfer to the
school of their choice. The transfer need not improve the level of
integration, however. This type of plan was common in the late
1960s, but was then disapproved, by the Supreme Court in Green
because it did not address the substantive issues of desegregation.
Examples of plans with this feature included the 1967 plans in
Polk County and Orange County, Florida.77
2. Magnet schools.
An increasingly popular voluntary technique, magnet schools
draw students from all over a district into special programs. Magnets can provide educational programs that are the focus of an entire school (dedicated magnets), or as part of a standard curriculum (mini-magnets or part-schools). Magnets can operate at an
elementary level, with an emphasis on special learning environments, or at a secondary level, with emphasis on particular vocational skills, math and science, languages, or performing arts. A
magnet may be "citywide" if enrollment is available to every student in the district, or may be a "neighborhood preference" magnet, which gives enrollment priority to a particular racial group. An
extensive magnet program was the basis of the plan in Jenkins.
Other magnet programs exist in Chicago, Milwaukee, and Seattle.
3. Other voluntary transfers.
Majority-to-minority ("m-to-m") transfers permit any student
to transfer from a school where he or she is in the racial majority
to one where he or she would be in the racial minority. Some m-tom plans, for example in Richmond and Buffalo, allow students in
the majority to transfer if the transfer would improve the overall
level of integration in the district. For example, a white student in
an 80 percent white district could transfer from a 90 percent white
school to a 70 percent white school.
7' Welch & Light, New Evidence at 24-28 (cited in note 18).
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The following six plan descriptions are taken from Welch & Light, Id at 24-28.

7 Id at 24.
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One-way transfers, a related technique, allow minority students in primarily minority schools to transfer to designated receiver schools. The transfer may occur within the district, or to
suburban districts as well.
4. Neighborhood attendance zones.
This mandatory technique assigns students to schools in their
neighborhoods. The technique was used primarily in the South to
end the dual practice of sending black children to distant schools
because nearer ones were designated for whites. The effectiveness
of this method depends on the original racial composition of the
neighborhood.
5. Pairing and clustering.
This mandatory technique involves reassigning students between a pair or group of schools, usually through grade restructuring. For example, a predominately white school and a predominately black school, both offering grades K through 6, were
reorganized into a lower elementary school with grades 1 through 3
and a higher elementary school with grades 4 through 6. Kindergarten remained unchanged. This technique was used in Little
Rock, Arkansas. 8 Pairing and clustering can result in single grade
schools, such as the three freshmen schools created in Fresno, California, or grade rotation, as in Jefferson County, Kentucky. There,
students were grouped randomly, then rotated to different schools
for different quarters or different grades on a predetermined
79
basis.
6. Re-zoning.
Re-zoning includes any change in attendance zones besides
pairing and clustering. Re-zoning can occur with the closing of a
school, the opening of a new school, the creation of magnet schools,
or simply to promote integration.
Contiguous re-zoning alters attendance boundaries between
adjacent schools, while noncontiguous re-zoning assigns minority
students to schools with an inadequate racial balance. These "satellite receiver" schools then receive minority students through busing. Noncontiguous re-zoning is more costly because of the added
transportation costs. The first re-zoning plan with busing was ap-
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See Clark v Board of Educ., 705 F2d 265 (8th Cir 1982).
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Welch & Light, New Evidence at 27-28.
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proved in Swann, and has formed the basis for many later desegregation plans.
B.

Types of Cities

Desegregation plans cannot be considered in a vacuum. Different remedies are effective in different kinds of cities. For example,
southern, rural towns are more spread out and depend on a local
school for a sense of community. The neighborhoods tend to be
more racially balanced, and cities tend to be smaller, making
southern school districts good candidates for pairing and clustering, or intradistrict re-zoning.8 0 Southern cities also have had a history of de jure8 1 segregation, which has led to carefully constructed
plans that have been carefully enforced to comply with court
mandates. 2
In contrast, interdistrict, or city-wide desegregation plans tend
to be more effective in the urban, industrialized North because
they force the generally affluent, mostly white suburbs to integrate
with the generally poor, minority-inhabited inner city.8 3 Goedert
argues that when the federal district court in Jenkins refused to
consider an interdistrict remedy, Kansas City could never enjoy
the benefits of full integration no matter what the plan included or
how much was spent.84 Interdistrict remedies that include the suburbs are harder to achieve after the Milliken decision, however.8 "
The size of northern urban school districts adds to the already
complex list of factors to consider in implementing a desegregation
plan. Northern cities are generally larger, and are divided into an
urban school district in the city proper surrounded by independent
suburban school districts. A study conducted by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that a more useful unit of sampling to
show desegregation patterns was the "metropolitan area." 6 The
largest metropolitan districts contained the largest administrative
school units with the most problems. For example, 42 states have
smaller total enrollments than metropolitan New York, metropoli80Id at 26 (cited in note 18). See also Paul Baier, Forum Juridicum: Framing and
Reviewing A DesegregationDecree: Of the Chancellor's Foot and Fifth Circuit Control, 47
La L Rev 123 (1986).
*' Defined in note 24.
*aWelch & Light, New Evidence at 26.
" See JoAnn Goedert, Jenkins v. Missouri: The Future of InterdistrictSchool Desegregation, 76 Georgetown L J 1867 (1988).
8

Id at 1912.

88See text accompanying notes 27-28.
8' Welch & Light, New Evidence at 34-35 (cited in note 18).
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tan Los Angeles, or metropolitan Chicago.17 Large urban districts
tend to have inefficient, centrally-controlled bureaucracies, that
add another level of administrative confusion to designing remedies.88 The inner districts of large urban cities tend to be economically depressed and inhabited by poor families, further eroding the
tax base from which to support the costs of a desegregation plan.
The central city district is generally older than the surrounding
suburban districts, with older school buildings and out-of-date,
run-down facilities requiring high maintenance costs. Many urban
districts contain mostly minority students-the Detroit City
School District, for example, is 90.8 percent black. 9
Thus, for any meaningful desegregation to take place, most researchers, as well as the overruled district court in Milliken, agree
that a large, urban district must engage in interdistrict desegregation with the suburbs.9 0 After the Milliken decision, however, in-'
terdistrict, metropolitan remedies are very difficult to obtain. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Milliken, wrote, "[wlhen we rule against
the metropolitan area remedy, we take a step that will likely put
the problems of the blacks and our society back to -the period that
antedated the 'separate but equal' regime of Plessy v. Ferguson."91
The strict test espoused in Milliken raised the plaintiff's burden of
proving that suburban districts had intentionally maintained practices causing segregative effects before they could be included in a
desegregation plan.
Opponents of interdistrict remedies claim that
interdistrict
plans cause white flight. However, white flight from the inner city
has been a long-term trend since World War II, long before interdistrict desegregation plans existed.2
Continued white
suburbanization, differential birthrates, and population age structures can explain many of the statistics pointed to by opponents of
interdistrict remedies.98 Thus, the problem of white flight experienced by large urban districts can be explained in part by demographic trends.
s1 Gary Orfield, School Desegregation Patternsin the States, Large Cities, and Metropolitan Areas-1968-1980: A Report to the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Committee on the Judiciaryof the U.S. House of Representatives, in Miller,

ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 30, 35 (cited in note 30).
88 Id.
so Welch & Light, New Evidence at 78.
*o Orfield, School Desegregation Patterns, in Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 34.
91 418 US 717, 752 (1974) (Douglas dissenting).
9 Orfield, School Desegregation Patterns, in Miller, ed, Brown Plus Thirty at 32-33

(cited in note 87).
93

Id.
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White flight following implementation of a desegregation remedy is a documented phenomenon, however. One study has found
that white flight increases most in the year of plan implementation, then declines.9 4 Also, white flight is greater when whites are
reassigned to minority school districts through busing, as opposed
to the usual technique of reassigning minorities to white school
districts.9 5 The same study also found that white flight increases if
the desegregation plan is "phased in" in stages, rather than implemented all at once, the implication being that whites have more
time to plan a relocation and find another school district.9 6 Interestingly, since information costs are too high for parents to evaluate data about the quality of the physical plant, average scholastic
reading scores, median socioeconomic status, or the suspension
rate of the current or considered school district, white parents generally make their decision to move based on the size of the school
and whether it is newly constructed, because this information is
easily obtainable. 7
Countywide, interdistrict, or metropolitan plans show less
white flight than city-only plans because (1) the suburbs are included, (2) residential relocation costs are greater, and (3) the suburban amenities are still present.9 8 Busing distance affects white
flight only in the implementation year. 9 Another interesting finding in the study showed that racist attitudes are only weakly correlated with white flight. Most residents surveyed supported integration, but both blacks and whites underestimated their neighbors'
support for integration by about 30 percent. 10 0 The consensus
seems to be that countywide plans are more effective than cityonly plans. 10 1
CONCLUSION
If interdistrict plans tend to be the most effective kind of remedy for urban districts, the plan in Jenkins was arguably doomed
from the start. 0 2 Creating six new magnet schools in the Kansas
" Rossell, 12 J Legal Stud at 85 (cited in note 55).
"' Id at 87.
Id at 89.
Id'at 91.
8 Rossell, 12 J Legal Stud at 89.
Id at 92 (cited in note 55).
'00 Id at 97-98.
Welch & Light, New Evidence at 43 (cited in note 18); Goedert, 76 Georgetown L J
at 1867 (cited in note 83).
102 Goedert, 76 Georgetown L J at 1867.
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City School District, where those six schools constitute the whole
system, does not seem to create much of a magnet. A voluntary
influx of suburban children into inner city schools seems optimistic
in a city with a long history of de jure segregation. 03 Without the
cooperation of other municipal branches to attack residential segregation or discrimination, such a huge investment of resources
into education alone seems shortsighted.0 4
The Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins "draws attention to
the disarray in the legal standards applied across the circuits to
decide metropolitan desegregation remedies,"'0 3 but fails to provide either a more clear standard or a more cogent solution to the
problems of implementing desegregation plans. Without better
guidance from the Supreme Court, judges must separate constitutionally-mandated remedies from optimal educational programs on
their own.
When the Court refused to grant certiorari on the scope of the
remedy involved in Jenkins, it divided two issues that are so intertwined as to be inseparable. The Court granted a powerful new
tool of judicial taxation to district courts for use in implementing
remedies,"0 ' while refusing to examine the practical elements of the
plan itself, which indicates that the plan will not produce effective
desegregation. That is not to say that courts should examine all
details and historical facts and attempt to solve decades of discrimination and racial injustice in one fell swoop. However, if a
high level of judicial intervention is warranted, as it seems to be,
and desegregation is a constitutionally mandated goal, then courts
should examine the many complex factors involved in designing a
remedy and order one that will be effective and be implemented
successfully.
The two issues of implementation and scope cannot be examined separately in a meaningful way. The Supreme Court, if it
is going to endorse strong judicial intervention through judicial
taxation, should also endorse the completion of the ends of which
13 Id.
104 See Note, Attacking School Segregation Root and Branch, 99 Yale L J 2003 (1990).
30

Goedert, 76 Georgetown L J at 1912.

Whether judicial taxation is a constitutionally sound principle is debatable. See
Note, 89 Colum L Rev 332 (cited in note 30), which argues for joint and several liability to
solve problems of financing. Note, however, that the district court in Jenkins refused to let

the state bear the whole burden of funding by itself, regardless of the factual liability, thus
necessitating an alternative means of funding through a tax levy. Thus, joint and several
liability does not necessarily solve the problem posed in cases in which judicial taxation is at

issue.

253]

DESEGREGATION REMEDY

273

taxation is only the means. Jenkins contained the most elaborate
desegregation remedy designed to date. Courts need to determine
whether elaborate schemes with elaborate funding can accomplish
the dictates of Brown without including an interdistrict solution.
Discrimination is a pervasive, ongoing problem in the schools that
requires more analysis and balancing to solve than the Court in
Jenkins appeared to recognize.

